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MARKET POWER AND REGULATION: 
THE LAST GREAT US DEPARTMENT STORE CONSOLIDATION? 
 
Abstract 
 
Purpose – To examine the impact of the merger of the two largest US department store companies 
on the competitive state of the sector and specifically the anti-trust implications of the 
consolidation. 
Approach – Based on semi-structured interviews with leading US department store executives as 
well as an ongoing close dialogue with US retail analysts.  
Findings – The consolidation raises considerable anti-trust issues with the creation of a $30bill 
sales company.  Consistent with previous recent rulings, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
adopted a broad view of the department store market from the standpoint that the consolidation is 
essentially defensive – in short, the sector is failing because it is not a separate and distinct market.  
However, the divestiture of 75 stores will give competitors footholds in new markets thereby 
changing the geography of competition in many catchments.  This is likely to be the largest 
consolidation that the competition authorities will effectively allow, representing the last 
opportunity for the sector to become a more robust competitor against alternative formats that have 
intervened in its key product lines.  
Originality/Value – Recent restructuring of the US department store industry has generated a 
relatively limited academic literature, despite considerable M&A activity, subsequent organisational 
reorganisation, and sales of $88 bill per year.  Transformation of the competitive landscape of the 
industry raises important issues of market regulation and corporate strategy. 
 
Article type – Viewpoint 
Keywords: department store; regulation; merger 
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Introduction 
Retail academics with an interest in corporate restructuring and market regulation will have turned 
their attention to events occurring in the US department store industry throughout 2005.  The two 
leading US department store operators, May and Federated, with fiscal 2004 sales of $14.4bill and 
$15.6bill respectively, agreed to merge creating a retailer accounting for 35% of what the US Dept. 
of Commerce terms ‘conventional and chain department store’ sales in the USA, and a significantly 
higher share of the more tightly defined traditional department store sector.  In turn, this acquisition 
is part of the broader ripple effects that have spread throughout the industry as the sector has 
consistently lost share of total retail sales, with sixth ranked firm Neiman Marcus agreeing to a 
$5.1bill acquisition by private equity groups Texas Pacific and Warburg Pincus, and fourth ranked 
firm Saks Inc announcing a splitting and partial sale of its business. 
 
The Federated/May merger represents a further seismic shift within an industry that has experienced 
constant restructuring over the past two decades.  Initially this was seen in the leveraged buy-out 
phenomenon of the late 1980s which ultimately led to the leading department store companies of 
the time filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection – notably Macys; Allied Stores; Carter Hawley 
Hale and Federated (Hallsworth, 1991; Wood, 2001).  There then followed, during the 1990s, a 
period of strategic portfolio restructuring whereby regional department store chains were acquired 
by newly emerging conglomerates (Wood, 2002a).  In turn this was accompanied by an intense 
period of cost cutting and organisational restructuring in order to attain the synergistic benefits that 
had been used to justify the consolidations (Wood, 2002b).  The latest shifts in the industry, in one 
sense, merely take the logic of that organizational restructuring further.  However they also raise a 
number of important issues which have wider implications for conceptual debate concerning merger 
& acquisition activity in retailing. 
 
In particular, the consolidation raises significant questions about US antitrust regulation.  The main 
issue is whether the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was correct to adopt a laissez-faire stance in 
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allowing the transaction to proceed, leaving State Attorney Generals to rule only on local 
divestment of stores in some catchments thereby protecting competitive conditions.  Clearly, the 
regulatory agency adopted the view that the transaction represented a ‘defensive merger’ given that 
the sector has been struggling because of strong competition from both discount operators (e.g. 
Wal-Mart, Target) and speciality apparel stores. 
 
While the merger was allowed to proceed by the FTC, a significant degree of local-market 
divestiture results – 75 stores in 72 malls - of which 47 were made to satisfy regulators.  As a result, 
it is important to interrogate how that geography of store disposal will alter the competitive 
landscape of the industry – giving a foothold to operators currently outside market leadership 
positions.  Analysis indicates that operators such as Nordstrom, JC Penney, Neiman Marcus and 
Sears are likely to be the main beneficiaries of any divestiture, gaining footholds in markets in 
which they are currently under-represented. 
 
In addition, it is also important to understand the broader implications of a merger that creates a 950 
store/$30bill sales company will have on the suppliers of that firm.  This is particularly the case in 
the context of the debates which have recently taken place in the UK concerning ‘market power’ 
and ‘codes of practice’ relating to retailers dealings with suppliers, following the Competition 
Commission’s inquiry into the supermarket sector in 2000 and its rulings in the case of the takeover 
of Safeway in 2003 (Wrigley, 2001, Burt and Sparks, 2003). 
 
Finally, the consolidation will drive another wave of organisational restructuring for these firms - a 
restructuring which is likely to see the Federated approach to merchandising, widely regarded to be 
more sophisticated than May’s, being applied to the acquired stores with a subsequent slimming of 
the supplier base.  The issue here is how this restructuring will rework the tension between national 
control that generates efficiencies and economies of scale, and local execution which demands 
sensitivity to local cultures of consumption (Wood, 2002b). 
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Background to the Merger 
Historical perspective 
Since the 1930s there has been consistent and regular forecasts of the imminent demise of the 
traditional department store in the US (see Nystrom, 1930 for an early example).  While the sector 
has steadily lost market share throughout the post war period, this deterioration was more marked 
during the 1990s when the format was essentially pressured from both ends of the quality/value 
spectrum.  In particular, apparel was increasingly merchandised across a wider range of value-
focused retailers with discount department stores such as Kohl’s and “big box” operators such as 
Wal-Mart and Target experiencing significant growth (see Figure 1 for a comparison of traditional 
and discount department store performance), whilst both middle market apparel specialists (e.g. 
Gap, The Limited) and fashion designer retailers (e.g. Prada, Gucci, etc – see Moore et al 2000) 
were also squeezing the department stores.  Between 1992 and 2004 market share of the traditional 
department store sector fell from nearly 6% of US retail sales to just over 3% (Figure 2).  However, 
it still represented a market of $88 billion. 
 
During the 1990s, traditional regional department stores in the USA, in particular, were left in a 
precarious position.  Lacking sufficient scale economies to secure sizeable discounts from suppliers 
they typically experienced only lower single digit or negative sales growth and their stock traded at 
low levels.  They were classic examples of companies effectively ‘stuck in the middle’ between 
larger operators, benefiting from scale-based efficiencies, and smaller operators who were more 
flexible and able to respond rapidly to opportunities (cf. Amatoa and Amatob, 2004).  As Michael 
Gould, Chairman of Bloomingdale's suggested in interview: 
 
‘If you are a stand alone business today in the department store world  …  what do you 
mean – what do you stand for?  Let’s say you are a $1 billion chain store in Pennsylvania – 
what’s [your]  power when [you] go into the marketplace… what’s [your] power when 
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[you] are up against $16 billion Federated or $14 billion May Company?  Awful difficult!’ 
(Interview 16). 
 
The reaction to this predicament was predictably a round of strategic consolidation throughout the 
1990s in efforts to centralise resources, take advantage of economies of scale, and focus on 
department store brands that could be leveraged nationwide (Table 1).   
 
Select firms, such as the seemingly insignificant Southern state operator Proffitt’s, were at the 
forefront of a wave of consolidation of regional department store chains not large enough to attract 
the attention of the larger players.  Proffitt’s growth was impressive: between 1988 and mid 1998 it 
increased its store portfolio by 340 and its square footage by 31·6 million square feet.  By 1999, 
revenues had increased to over $6·4 billion and culminated in the acquisition of Saks Holdings at 
the end of 1998 (Wood, 2002a).   
 
With the rapidly growing store portfolios that came from the consolidation wave, the major 
department store operators were faced with the task of rationalising and streamlining their 
organisational structures.  In the past, US department stores had operated as many as 15 divisions or 
fascias, each with its own buying, accounting, credit and distribution facilities.  The high costs that 
resulted made the format increasingly uncompetitive - they simply had too many decentralised 
divisions with too many buyers, hampered by a bureaucratic decision-making process, often lacking 
a central theme.  In addition, and particularly in the case of larger companies, there was a lack of 
information flow through the retailer-supplier interface due to a dearth of coordinated systems with 
consequent difficulties executing key trends across divisions (see Biederman, 1991).  As a result, 
the 1990s was also a period of centralisation of the organisation of these larger players with the 
provision of shared administrative services, the concentration of buying and merchandising and the 
consolidation of formally autonomous divisions.  Terry Lundgren, President of Federated explained 
the rationale for the developments: 
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‘…we have a point of view that if the customer does not see it or feel it then it is an 
opportunity to be reduced or eliminated …. Every division used to have their own separate 
organisation – we don’t need that anymore….All of our technology, all of our systems, 
computer operations – every division used to have their own set up for that.  Now there is 
one state of the art organisation outside of Atlanta that services all of the systems needs for 
our stores.  One credit facility in Ohio services all of them’ (Interview 23). 
 
The predicament in 2005 
The upshot of this round of portfolio and subsequent organisational restructuring by 2005 was a 
highly concentrated sector dominated by a handful of operators – notably May and Federated (see 
Tables 2 and 3).  However, so intense was the pressure on the department store operators that even 
the market leaders struggled to perform relative to market expectations.  The May Company in 
particular saw its comparable store sales follow a largely negative trend since the late 1990s (Figure 
3).  In an effort to achieve scale related efficiencies and access good store locations May paid £3.2 
billion for Marshall Field’s in 2004.  There was an essential logic to this acquisition as May was 
able to acquire a strong retail brand and market presence particularly in Illinois, Michigan and 
Minnesota.  Nevertheless, the consensus of the capital markets was that May paid an unjustified 
premium for Marshall Field’s, and coupled with poor performance from its core business, this 
precipitated the exit of CEO, Gene Kahn, in January 2005.   
 
The removal of Kahn offered the opportunity for Federated to re-open merger discussions with May 
and a deal was agreed on the basis of a purchase price of $11 billion.  The logic of the May-
Federated tie up is geographically sound.  Federated is particularly strong on the East and West 
coasts as well as in the South-East/Florida market.  May had stores in Southern California, the 
North-East and Midwest.  The acquisition of May essentially offered Federated a new presence in 
important markets such as Texas, Chicago, Minneapolis and St. Louis, plus the opportunity to 
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introduce its up-market Bloomingdale’s fascia into affluent catchments (e.g. in the Chicago area) 
well suited to such an offer.  Strategically, Federated is also well placed in terms of expertise at 
executing department store acquisitions given its previous acquisitions of Macy’s and Broadway in 
the mid 1990s. 
 
Retail Regulation and the US Department Store Industry 
Elsewhere we and others have documented the make up of the regulatory framework impacting the 
US retail industry and how previous mergers and acquisitions have been dealt with by the 
competition authorities (Balto, 2001; Wood, 2001; Wrigley, 1992, 1999, 2001, 2002).  We have 
noted how the FTC has essentially operated what might be termed a “fix-it-first” approach, agreeing 
not to oppose mergers and acquisitions where the acquiring firm committed itself in advance (under 
the spirit of the Celler Kefauver Act) to divest itself of all clear horizontal market overlaps that 
might be deemed to be uncompetitive at the local level.  In contrast, individual State Attorney 
Generals, have often sought to impose far more rigorous antitrust enforcement with much stronger 
impacts on the nature of retail competition in particular local markets.   
 
The continued employment of a “fix-it-first” approach by the FTC was made clear by the current 
Chairman of the FTC, Deborah Platt Majoras, who confirmed ‘a willingness to accept fix-it-first 
offers from parties’ (Majoras, 2004, p 8).  Previously there had been growing concerns over 
retailers essentially making ineffective divestitures and thereby keeping the better stores for 
themselves (Cotterill, 1999) which raised question marks about the approach.  Nevertheless as the 
Director of the FTC noted: 
 
‘If the Commission concludes that a proposed settlement will remedy a merger’s 
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market, it will likely accept that settlement and not 
seek to prevent (or unwind) the merger.  In most situations, the [FTC] is most likely to 
support the parties’ offer to divest an autonomous, on-going business unit that comprises at 
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least the entire business of one of the merging parties in the relevant market, attempting to 
recreate the premerger competitive environment’ (Simons, 2003, p 4/5). 
 
The execution of “fix-it-first” involves, as George Strachan of Goldman Sachs observed, the 
acquirer making ‘some strategic decisions regarding what the likely outcome of the FTC will be’. In 
its turn: 
 
‘the acquirer probably makes an educated guess as to what the FTC is likely to demand and 
they try to accommodate the most obvious overlaps before the FTC orders them to do so.  It 
is probably built into their plan before the FTC has even announced it’ (Interview 8). 
 
This has frequently allowed competitors to take advantage of stores divested due to overlap, though 
rarely on a scale that is suggested by the scale of the Federated/May merger.   
 
Federal regulators had rarely blocked a merger in the department store industry.  Partly, as an Ernst 
& Young analyst suggested, that is because the FTC ‘are not as sensitive as they are in apparel as 
they are in food’.  But more so, it is because the FTC historically argues that the department store 
sector is, in practice, not a separate market.  Indeed, as a prominent former major department store 
CEO commented: 
 
‘I think what the FTC has historically done is smart and appropriate and that is they have 
looked at retail as a broader issue than just department stores.  Our competitor for our 
business is not just another department store. …In a typical market, department stores may 
in the aggregate have 25% of the general merchandise, apparel and furniture [the GAF 
figure], so clearly 75% of the competition is not department stores - it is other forms of 
retail.  So the FTC appropriately has looked at these from that perspective and concluded 
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that even after the merger of two companies the share of the market they have is not counter 
to the beliefs of the FTC’. 
 
However, some strong arguments were mounted for outright refusal of the merger by the FTC:  The 
combination of Federated and May creates a $30 billion retailer accounting for approximately 70% 
of traditional department store sales among public companies, and approximately 30% of the mall 
anchor stores in the US.  The combined entity also accounts for 40%-50% of the moderate to high 
end apparel market in the US, and 25%-50% of the sales of many of the upscale suppliers (Merrill 
Lynch 2005a). 
 
There were some precedents for regulatory action; even in the department store sector.  In 1994, for 
example, May attempted to purchase six McCurdy’s department stores in Rochester NY, to add to 
the four Kaufmann’s stores it already owned there.  An independent regional chain (Bon-Ton) with 
nine stores in the area protested.  The FTC rejected the complaint, taking the view that the 
department store sector was merely part of a larger market for apparel and furniture.  Undeterred, 
Bon-Ton took the matter to the Federal Court, and the New York Attorney General joined the case 
successfully convincing the judge that the department store sector was a separate market and 
therefore blocked the merger.  However, it is notable that this example concerned a small local 
transaction where there was a high percentage of local market overlap and at a time when the 
department store sector accounted for a higher share of apparel sales than today.  In contrast, the 
Federated/May merger did not generate high amounts of store duplication except in two or three 
core markets. 
 
Outcomes: Divestiture and Market Entry for Competitors 
Consistent with previous rulings, the FTC took the view that the Federated /May case represented a 
defensive merger driven by the continuous poor performance of the department store sector vis-à-
vis alternative retail formats.  In short that the reason the sector is failing is because it is not a 
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separate and distinct market.  In a document submitted to the Securities & Exchange Commission, 
Federated had argued: 
 
‘The retail environment is intensely competitive and department stores today compete against 
all retail formats.  Success is contingent on our ability to realize greater economies of scale, 
and that is beneficial to consumers in the long run because it means more competition 
overall’ (FDS, 2005b, p 4). 
 
The FTC’s findings mirrored the retailer’s submission very closely as the regulatory body noted that 
a broad definition of the market must be taken as ‘today’s mall is itself a real competitor against 
traditional department stores’ (FTC, 2005, p 2) and that ‘conventional department stores...no longer 
occupy the unique position they once held, even for the more limited range of products that they 
sell.  While department stores once were a distinctive niche market, they now face pressures both 
from “above” and “below” even in the same mall, not to mention mass market, mail order, and 
Internet alternatives’ (FTC, 2005, p 2). 
 
Given the FTC’s view of the market, it appears that Federated’s pre-emptive voluntary disposal 
proposition of 68 stores in 66 mall locations was largely irrelevant in winning FTC permission.  In 
fact the FTC went even further to effectively argue that divestitures should not be necessary as 
‘(t)he evidence shows that the parties’ conventional department stores do not comprise a separate 
relevant product market, and that an individual mall does not constitute a relevant geographic 
market’ (FTC, 2005, p 4, my emphasis).  However, the FTC is the national anti-trust regulatory 
agency and localised individual divestitures are determined by individual State Attorney Generals, 
not the FTC. 
 
The markets of California and the North-Eastern USA were the areas of highest store overlap 
between the two retailers (Figure 4).  In California, Federated faced its most considerable 
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difficulties.  Having volunteered to the divestiture of 22 stores in its “fix-it-first” submission, it was 
forced by the State of California Attorney General to increase this by a further four outlets to take 
total divestiture to 26 stores.  This accounts for over 4 million square feet of retail space that will be 
sold and approximately 5,000 jobs in this single state (Figure 5).  Under this agreement, when 
divesting stores Federated must ‘give priority to Macy’s and Robinsons-May traditional competitors 
in the department store market’ thereby retaining competition levels in these catchments (Office of 
the Attorney General, 2005a). 
 
Similarly, the New York Attorney General insisted upon sale of two stores in Long Island that were 
in addition to the initial Federated “fix-it-first” submission (Office of the Attorney General, 2005b) 
while the Massachusetts Attorney General insisted on one additional divestiture (see Table 4).  
Clearly Federated was extremely accurate in forecasting the reactions of the competition authorities. 
 
The overall divestiture of 75 stores in 72 mall locations – equivalent to $2.1 billion in sales at 2004 
prices - has the effect of giving market access to competitors currently without any strong presence, 
in the process fundamentally changing the geography of department store retailing on the east and 
west coasts of the USA.  The firm most likely to be the primary beneficiary of the divestiture is 
Nordstrom, acquiring units primarily in New York and New Jersey where it is currently under-
represented.  Nordstrom’s store portfolio is currently 95 department stores of about 200,000 sq ft 
each spread across 27 states, but primarily focused on the West Coast and the North-West.  Neiman 
Marcus, JC Penney and Saks (in its pre-sale/split form) also have opportunities to take advantage of 
the divestitures due to occur in 2006 - again dependent on issues of current market presence relative 
to competitors and the affluence of specific catchments (Table 5).  Clearly the geography of 
divestiture has the effect not only of reworking the spatial spread of the firms involved in the 
merger, but equally firms whose store networks are currently far removed from the areas of 
horizontal market overlap between the merging firms. 
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Implications of the Commercial Logic of the Merger 
 
Increasing pressure on suppliers  
A key argument for the merger, and not least an issue that the FTC could have used to bar it 
outright, are the potential implications for suppliers.  While the formation of a $30bill sales 
department store chain does not represent an unduly high share of total US apparel sales, it 
represents a significant proportion of upper-end apparel sales and therefore a high proportion of the 
sales of suppliers such as Liz Claiborne and Ralph Lauren.  Indeed Merrill Lynch (2005a) estimates 
that the combined entity could account for up to 50% of sales of many of the upper-end suppliers.  
This is evidently a level at which price discrimination could become a real possibility.  However, 
this view was rejected as the FTC viewed department store companies competing in a broader retail 
market and that higher end apparel was not itself an independent product market. 
 
Another way in which the supplier base is likely to be impacted results from the likely consolidation 
of the private label brands of the merged company.  As widely discussed in the literature, private 
label offers a range of advantages to the retailer.  First, the retailer has control over the offer, 
arrangement and development (Sayman and Raju, 2004).  Second, private labels offer the potential 
for margin enhancement (Porter, 1999).  Third, own label provides distinctive ranges that are unique 
to the firm and not available through competitor’s stores.  This is especially important in the 
department store sector as many of the difficulties with the retail format have been centred on 
competitors selling the same branded products at lower prices elsewhere.  
 
Federated has put considerable effort into building a strong portfolio of private labels via its 
centralised support operation, Federated Merchandising Group.  As with many other retailers, it 
offers a range of private labels that are specific to certain ‘lifestyle’ or age categories.  The result is 
that Federated’s penetration of private label at 17.4% of sales is significantly higher than that of 
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May at 13%.  Given that Federated has publicly stated its aim to increase private label penetration 
to over 20% of sales, this presents a considerable opportunity at the acquired May stores. 
 
The power of brand over regional identity 
Another major motivation for the merger is the recognition of the power of Federated lead brands: 
Macy’s and, to a lesser extent, Bloomingdale’s.  Indeed prior to the announcement of the May 
acquisition, Federated had already started to convert its regional department store nameplates (Bon 
Marche; Burdines; Rich’s; Lazurus and Goldsmith’s) to the Macy’s brand (Table 6) attempting to 
leverage Macy’s historic importance in US commercial and public life – not least Macy’s 
Thanksgiving Day Parade in New York City (Wrigley and Lowe, 2002, 203).   
 
With May Department Stores currently operating from 12 nameplates1, Federated has decided to 
further enhance its Macy’s-focused marketing strategy on a national scale by converting the vast 
majority of the estate to the nameplate and gaining considerable scale economies in advertising as a 
result.  The customer loyalty to Macy’s that is built up and sustained by hundreds of thousands of 
customer visits each week can clearly be leveraged into new geographical locations.  However, 
there are obvious risks – not least that retailers are embedded within the community and regional 
nameplates are a source of local pride (Landy et al., 2005).  As a result, a sense of local 
disenfranchisement, felt in the short term by some customers is a key issue which the merged firm 
will have to sensitively negotiate - not least in Chicago where the venerated identity of Marshall 
Fields will be lost forever. 
 
As the CEO of Federated recently made clear, the merger also allows Federated access to more 
affluent catchments currently inadequately served by the May stores. 
 
                                                 
1
 Famous-Barr, Filene’s, Foley’s Hecht’s, Kaufmann’s, Lord & Taylor, L.S. Ayres, Marshall Field’s Meier & 
Frank, Robinson-May, Strawbridge’s, and the Jones Store 
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‘May Company has many locations whose demographics are higher than what their current 
assortments would indicate, and we believe we will add considerable value there’ (FDS, 
2005a, p 4). 
 
In these more affluent catchments, Federated’s strategy will be to introduce its higher end 
Bloomingdale’s fascia - converting less well-suited mid-market May fascias such as Hecht’s or 
Stawbridge’s2. 
 
Reworking of merchandising scale 
The final commercial argument for the merger centres on the fact that Federated has a superior 
system of buying and merchandising than May and has the potential to leverage this to the acquired 
stores.  Similar to sophisticated food retailers such as Tesco, Federated centralises its buying yet 
attempts to remain sensitive to local markets by employing models of customer behaviour, 
affluence and catchment type (cf. Humby et al., 2003).  Indeed, much of the popular criticism of US 
department store retailing has focused on the lack of tailoring of the offer to local markets resulting 
in a ‘sea of merchandise’ that is available but not adequately segmented (Wileman, 1993).  As a 
result, much of the merger activity throughout the 1990s was centred on unleashing the potential 
economies of scale that exist in department store retailing, but were traditionally neglected due to a 
previous overly regionalised buying and operational focus (Wood, 2002a).   
 
Federated’s strategy of micro-merchandising from a centralised organization is crucial to its 
success.  The Macy’s Merchandising Group (MMG) support office3, using models of customer 
behaviour at the local level, allows more intelligent decisions to be made.  As Federated CEO, Terry 
Lundgren commented,  
 
                                                 
2 No decision has yet been made regarding any conversion of the May division, Lord & Taylor. 
3 Until 2005 MMC was known as Federated Merchandising Group (FMG) and renamed with the divisional 
consolidation that left two Federated divisions – Macys and Bloomingdales - the latter of which merchandises 
some of its stores via Associated Merchandising Corporation (AMC). 
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‘We’re very focused on the location analysis of what the consumer wants in that particular 
store and market.  To that end we have defined our customers into four segments – 
traditional, updated, neotraditional and contemporary….We have a…..distributor 
organization [MMG] whose responsibility is to tailor those assortments into these stores’ 
(FDS, 2005a, p 7.). 
 
In addition to providing a lifestyle template specific to each store, MMG supplies a matrix of core 
vendors from which the Federated divisions are strongly encouraged to select.  As Vice President of 
Federated, Carol Sanger suggested in an interview, the merchandising group ‘scouts the market and 
determines what everybody should look at.…and makes some decisions based on economies of 
scale….but allow the divisions, where the customers see it, to have their own identity’ (Interview 
3). 
 
Historically the tension between local and centralised merchandising has been much more difficult 
to negotiate in fashion rather than food retailing owing to regional variations in demand (Wood, 
2002b).  Gradually a centralised model of organisation has emerged albeit with sensitivity to local 
markets so as ‘to enable the store management to maintain links to the buyers and strategists in head 
office as well as to the customers but within the structure of a very large firm’ (Dawson, 2000, p 
125).  It is these efficiencies that the merger has the potential to realise. 
 
Conclusions 
The Federated/May merger promises to be the last great consolidation of the US department store 
industry – a process that has a rich history and can be traced back to the 1920s with the construction 
of large ownership groups (Pasdermadjian, 1954), into the 1980s with the period of financial 
restructuring (Hallsworth, 1991; Rothchild, 1991), subsequent department store bankruptcies, 
followed by the round of strategic regional consolidations throughout the 1990s (Wood, 2002b).  
While the Federated/May merger has been waved through by the FTC given the strong wider 
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competition for department store retailers, further M&A activity by these operators will not escape 
regulatory action at the State level.  In many respects therefore, the merger represents the last great 
‘throw of the dice’ for these formerly powerful retail giants in a consolidation vital to the survival 
prospects of the sector.   
 
However, Federated faces a tall order given that it is embarking on a defensive merger with a 
troubled retailer currently experiencing negative like-for-like sales in a sector itself characterised by 
low growth.  Recent academic research has noted that the lead company must pay immediate 
attention to remove “them and us” perspectives and encourage a shared organisational identity 
(Marks and Mirvis, 2001).  Therefore, the construction of a “Transition Team” containing 
executives from both companies has important symbolic as well as practical overtones, as does the 
commitment not to eliminate jobs before March 1 2006.  Beyond cultural obstacles, the task to 
turnaround May by integrating the systems, retail fascias and customer offer remains the 
overarching challenge on the horizon. 
 
The consolidation is indicative of the wider ripple effects spreading throughout the sector as 
retailers reassess their store portfolios in the light of the emergence of more efficient operators 
focusing on a handful of powerful retail brands.  This has partly led to Saks Inc disposing of its 
Proffitt’s and McRae department store divisions to Belk Inc while Neiman Marcus Group (which 
also owns Bergdorf Goodman) has been taken private via its purchase by two private equity groups.  
These smaller transactions are likely to continue in the short term in moves, that while less extreme 
than the 1990s period of restructuring, are still fundamentally driven by the same imperatives of 
maximising returns through the realisation of operational efficiencies. 
 
More broadly for the sector, this merger raises issues of retail regulation, market power, leveraging 
market scale economies, and tensions between spatial scales of buying and merchandising.  The 
merger also has a distinct spatial logic.  In turn, that triggers a geography of divestment which offers 
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the opportunity for competitors to gain footholds in markets - in the process transforming the 
competitive landscape of the industry.  All these we believe, are significant themes worthy of 
attention by retail academics with interests in corporate strategy and market regulation. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: US conventional department store sales 1992 - 2004 
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Figure 2: Conventional & chain department store sales as a % of total retail sales 1992-
2004 
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Figure 3: May and Federated like-for-like performance 2001-2004 
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Figure 4: Federated and May Pre-Merger Store Geography 
 
Located in a separate Powerpoint document 
 
 
Figure 5: Divestment in California from Federated/May Merger 
 
Located in a separate Powerpoint document 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Selected U.S. Conventional Department Store Acquisitions, 1990-2005 
 
Date Acquirer Acquired  Cost ($ bill) 
(If known) 
No of Stores 
(If known) 
1990 May Thalhimers, N/D 26 
1990 Dayton 
Hudson 
Marshall Field 1.40 N/D 
1990 Investcorp. Saks Fifth Avenue  N/D 
1992/3 Proffitt’s Hess 0.21 18 
1994 Proffitt’s McRae’s 0.34 28 
1994 Bon-Ton Hess N/D 20 and distribution 
centre 
1994 May 10 stores from Hess’s. N/D 10 
1994 Federated Joseph Horne Co. of 
Pittsburgh. 
N/D N/D 
1994 Federated R. H. Macy 4.10 123 
1994 Proffitt’s Parks-Belk N/D 3 
1995 May 16 Wanamaker and 
Woodward & Lothrop 
stores  
N/D 16 
1995 May and J. C. 
Penney 
Woodward 0.46 N/D 
1995 Federated Broadway 1.60 82 
1996 May 13 Strawbridge & Clothier 
stores 
0.48 13 
1996 Proffitt’s Younker’s 0.26 51 
1996 Proffitt’s Parisian  0.45 38 
1996 Belk Leggett Stores 0.92  
1997 Proffitt’s Herberger’s  0.16 40 
1998 Proffitt’s Carson Pirie Scott 0.96 55 
1998 Proffitt’s Broady’s  N/D 6 
1998 Dillard Mercantile 2.9 103  
1998 Gottschalks The Harris Company  0.04 9 
1998 Proffitt’s Saks Holdings 2.10 96 
1999 May ZMCI  0.05 14 
2001 May Saks Inc. 0.31 9 
2001 Target Montgomery Ward N/D 35 
2003 Bon-Ton Elder Beerman 0.09 68 
2004 May Marshall Field from Target 3.20 62 
2005 Federated May  11.00 491 
2005 Belk Proffitt’s & McRae stores 0.70 47 
2005 Texas Pacific 
Group & 
Warburg 
Pincus LLC 
Neiman Marcus Group 5.1 51 
Source: Author’s database 
 
 
 24
 
Table 2: Leading conventional US department store sales, 2004 
 
Department Store Retailer 2004 
($ mill) 
Implied Market Share of 
Conventional and Chain Department 
Store Sales** 
   
Federated 15,630 17.8% 
May* 14,441 16.4% 
Dillards 7,529 8.6% 
Nordstrom 7,131 8.1% 
Saks 6,437 7.3% 
Neiman Marcus 3,534 4.0% 
Conventional & Chain Department Store 
Sales 2004 
87,857  
 
Sources: US Department of Commerce and retailer’s annual reports 
* By the end of 2004, May was the largest department store operator given it acquisition of Marshall 
Field's. 
** The US Dept of Commerce’s definition of ‘conventional and chain department stores’ also includes 
operators such as JC Penney and Sears.  Therefore, this analysis essentially underplays the concentration 
in the conventional department store sector if it was classified separately (which it is not).  
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Table 3 Major Department Store Rationalisation, 1985-2004 
 
 
Fiscal 1985 
Company No. of Divisions Sales ($ mill) 
Federated Dept. Stores 11 6,685 
RH Macy 4 4,368 
Carter Hawley Hale 6 3,979 
Allied Stores 17 3,349 
May Dept. Stores 10 3,327 
Associated Dry Goods 10 2,724 
Batus 5 2,300 
Mercantile Stores 13 1,880 
Dillard Dept. Stores 5 1,601 
Dayton Hudson 2 1,448 
Nordstrom 1 1,302 
Total 84 32,963 
 
Fiscal 2004 
Company No. of Divisions Sales ($ mill) 
Federated Dept. Stores 2 15,630 
May Dept. Stores 7 14,441 
Dillard Dept. Stores 1 7,529 
Nordstrom 1 7,131 
Saks Inc 10 6,437 
Neiman Marcus 2 3,534 
Total 23 54,702 
 
Source: Fiscal 1985 data from Goldman Sachs (1996) Department Stores: Rediscovering the Reinvented, 
Goldman Sachs Investment Research, New York, May 3, 1996, p 30.  The remainder developed from 
company reports. 
 
 26
Table 4: Attorney General Rulings versus Initial Federated “fix-it-first” Divestiture 
Proposals 
 
State Original Federated 
“fix-it-first” 
submission 
State Attorney 
General Ruling 
Additional stores for 
divestiture (in excess of 
original “fix-it-first” 
submission) 
California 22 26 4 
Maryland 4 4 0 
Pennsylvania 9 7 0 
New York 1 3 2 
Massachusetts 6 7 1 
  47 7 
 
Source: Reports from the Attorney General’s for the 5 States and press releases from 
Federated Department Stores 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Forecast beneficiaries of divestiture 
 
Department 
Store 
Current Geographical 
Market Focus 
Region of likely gains 
Nordstrom West Coast & North-West New York; New Jersey 
JC Penney Nationwide Various locations – principally 
California 
Saks Nearly nationwide California New Jersey, Illinois most 
likely 
Neiman Marcus Texas, Florida, California, 
New Jersey 
Various but principally California; 
Florida; Connecticut, Illinois; Texas; 
New York; Ohio; Virginia 
 
Source: adapted and developed from Merrill Lynch analysis 
NB. It should be noted that Sears are likely to have the largest claim on divested stores.  However, 
this retailer is excluded from this analysis as it is generally recognised as being outside of the 
conventional and chain department store sector 
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Table 6 : Consolidation of Federated fascias, March 2005 
 
 
   Adding Macys to their name 
 Macys 
West 
Macys East Bloomingdale’s Rich’s, 
Lazurus & 
Goldsmith’s 
Burdines Bon 
Marche 
2003 sales 
($bill) 
4.2 4.7 1.9 2.0 1.3 1.0 
Numbers of 
stores 
146 93 36 71 61 51 
Total gross 
sq feet 
(bill) 
23.4 23.1 8.1 13.4 10.4 5.7 
Employees 29,900 28,100 11,100 15,000 10,600 7,00 
Markets Southwest, 
Minnesota, 
Hawaii, 
Guam 
Northeast, 
Mid Atlantic, 
Minnesota 
and Puerto 
Rico 
Southwest, 
Southeast, East 
and Central 
Southeast, 
Central and 
Pennsylvania 
Florida Northwest 
Source: Federated Department Stores, 2004 
 
 
 
